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‘We don’t torture’, said George W. Bush in November 2005.2 His statement was a 
 simple statement of fact, and it was false. The US had been torturing detainees, with 
the express permission of Donald Rumsfeld, the Secretary of Defense, since late 
2002.3
In January 2009, on his second day as president, Barack Obama used the same 
words. It is possible that some torture was still then going on. But even if  it was, 
Obama’s words would not have been straightforwardly false, for he was using them in 
a different way, as the full quotation makes clear: 
1 Material from this paper was also presented to audiences at MIT, Cambridge, Sheffield, Southampton, 
Yale and LMU. I am very grateful for the comments received on those occasions, and to Rae Langton 
and Judy Thomson for comments on the written version.
2 At a news conference in Panama City, 7 November 2005. For a further statement nearly two years later 
to much the same effect see The New York Times 6 October 2007: ‘This government does not torture’.
3 According to ABC News, 11 April 2008, Bush admitted that he was aware that his National Security 
Team had discussed ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ including waterboarding. So it seems likely that 
he was not simply speaking falsely; he was lying.
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We believe we can abide by a rule that says, We don’t torture, but we can effectively 
obtain the intelligence we need.4
The pragmatics here are complicated. In part Obama was reporting his conviction 
that torture was not required to obtain the intelligence that the US thought it needed. 
Beyond that, though, speaking as Commander in Chief, Obama’s words had the force 
of a command not to torture, a command that was more clearly expressed in an execu­
tive order signed on the same day.5 But they also had the force of a commitment, a 
first­person­plural version of the kind of thing that is more normally expressed in the 
singular: I don’t lie, I don’t steal, I don’t cheat, I don’t torture.
My focus in this paper is on this last idea, on the idea, as I shall call it, of the moral 
resolution. Resolutions are familiar enough in other domains. Temptation tends to 
corrupt judgement: under its lure our view of what is best will often shift. Resolutions 
help to prevent this. By committing, in advance, to a certain course of action, we 
remove the need for deliberation under temptation, and so reduce the risk of suc­
cumbing. Much the same happens, I will argue, with moral resolutions. In the heat of 
the moment—a provocation, a war, a major terrorist attack—judgements may be cor­
rupted, so that some may be tempted to pursue policies—such as torture—that in a 
cool hour would have been seen to be wrong. It is by forming moral resolutions we can 
resist such slippage. 
Moral resolutions are worthy of study in themselves, and part of my interest is in 
looking at how they work. I want, though, to do something more. I want to use moral 
resolutions to shed some light on the doctrine of double effect—on the doctrine that 
the intention with which an action is done can have some impact on that action’s per­
missibility. In recent years that doctrine has come under sustained criticism from 
Judith Jarvis Thomson and Thomas Scanlon. The thrust of their criticism stems from 
the initially compelling idea that in deliberating whether an action is permissible, we 
should look outward, to the action and its consequences, rather than inward, to the 
actor’s intentions. Thomson asks you to imagine that you are a doctor, deciding 
whether it is permissible to give a dying patient the fatal dose of morphine that he 
requests. She says:
Suppose that, pursuant to the hospital’s rules, you ask me—I am the appropriate 
 hospital official—whether it is legally permissible for you to inject the lethal dose. I 
reply: ‘Well, I don’t know. I can’t tell unless you tell me what your intention would be 
in injecting the drug. If  you would be injecting to cause death, either as means or end, 
then no. But if  you would be injecting only to cause relief  from pain, then yes.’ This is 
4 The New York Times 23 January 2009.
5 The executive order required all interrogation to follow the Army Field Manual, a document that had 
forbidden torture for many years.
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an absurdity. How on earth could it be thought proper for the legal permissibility of 
acceding to turn on what the doctor intends to bring about by acceding? Surely it 
should turn on the patient’s condition and wishes.6
In many cases asking after an agent’s intention in such circumstances would indeed 
be absurd, and I will endeavour to give some explanation of why. Nevertheless, I think 
that understanding the role of moral resolutions shows that a purely outward focus—
in this case on the patient’s condition and wishes—is inadequate. When an agent is in 
a morally tempting situation that corrupts their judgement, focusing just on the  merits 
of the case will often lead to moral disaster. Instead, they will need to go back to the 
resolutions they formed earlier. This will involve a focus on their intentions twice over: 
first, because their resolutions are themselves intentions; and second, because, since 
those resolutions will themselves typically be formed in terms of intentional actions, 
they will need to understand their current motivations if  they are to decide whether 
they are sticking with them or not.
If  it is right that effective moral actors will often need to look in to their own 
 intentions rather than out to the world, that rather undercuts the Thomson/Scanlon 
argument against the doctrine of double effect. However, it does not by itself  do any­
thing to re­establish that doctrine. Even if  it is true that, in situations of temptation, 
actors will often need to look to their intentions, it does not follow that we assess the 
rightness of their actions by whether or not they do so. If  actors behave well without 
recourse to their resolutions, that is fine; we do not think that there is something 
 missing. And even if  they do look to their resolutions, why should we think that the 
content of those resolutions will need to allude to intentions? So if  an account of 
moral resolutions is to underpin a defence of something like the doctrine of double 
effect, more will have to be said. 
The final idea I explore here is that, if  they are to be effective, resolutions must 
indeed make reference to agents’ intentional actions; so they point us towards an 
account in which intentional actions provide the primitive bedrock upon which our 
moral judgements are built. Such an account does not support a literal­minded doc­
trine of double effect, since, in central cases, it denies that the same action can be 
performed with different intentions: change the intention and one changes the inten­
tional action. But it captures what I take to be the truth in the doctrine: namely, that 
intention matters.
That, in outline, is my path. I start by looking at resolutions.
6 Thomson (1997).
312 Richard Holton 
MORAL RESOLUTIONS
Why do we need resolutions even in simple non­moral cases? Why try to bind  ourselves 
in advance? After all, it is surely rational to make a decision using all of the available 
information, including that which will only be available later. If  we abstractly resolve 
at New Year to give up chocolate, that fails to take into account the information about 
just how attractive the chocolate will be each time it is actually offered, information 
that would be available if  we were just to wait to decide each case on its merits. So 
wouldn’t it be more rational to avoid resolutions altogether?
Most of us have enough self­knowledge to realise that there is something wrong 
with this line of thought. We know that the chocolate can tempt us: it can lead us to 
eat it when in prospect we didn’t want to, and when in retrospect we will regret what 
we have done. One way to understand that is in terms of a shift in desires. The prox­
imity of the chocolate, whether temporal or spatial, leads us to desire it more than we 
do when it is not close. But that is only part of what is going on. In addition, the pres­
ence of the chocolate influences our beliefs. If  we start to think about it, we will 
 convince ourselves that it will give us more pleasure than we had anticipated, or that 
the reasons for abstaining are not really so strong, at least not on this occasion. We 
can, after all, always give up chocolate tomorrow.7 The rules governing our behaviour 
are almost never absolute—almost any rule will admit of exceptions. So, with a little 
ingenuity, we can almost always find the room for rationalisation and self­deception.
This means that resolutions have two complementary roles to play. They serve to 
enshrine our earlier desires and our earlier reasoning against the competition of the 
desires that arise in the moment of temptation. But, in addition, they serve to enshrine 
our earlier reasoning against the competition of the reasoning that we would do in the 
moment of temptation. That is why we should not open our resolutions up to recon­
sideration when the temptation is upon us. The empirical evidence bears this out. 
Dieters who form implementation intentions to see them through tempting moments—
intentions such as ‘If  there are left­overs, I will freeze them immediately’—are more 
successful at losing weight than those who simply form the goal of losing weight. 
When they arrive at the tempting moment, their plan carries them though—more 
precisely, the presence of the left­overs serves as a cue to trigger the implementation 
of the action, and so the food goes into the freezer with scarcely a second thought. But 
if  they add to the implementation intention a because­clause—‘If there are left­overs, 
I will freeze them immediately because I want to remain slim’—all of the benefits are 
lost. Now the presence of the left­overs serves as cue to trigger not just an action but 
7 See my Willing, Wanting, Waiting (Holton 2009: Ch. 5) for a discussion of the empirical evidence on 
this.
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also an awareness of the reason for that action. That in turn leads the dieters to  reconsider 
that intention, and then to find a reason not to act on it.8 Again, it is because the rules 
governing our behaviour are not absolute that we have the leeway to rationalise.
I suggest that much the same structure applies in the weightier cases of moral 
temptation, although admittedly here the empirical evidence is rather thin. Here too 
there is temptation to do the wrong thing, and since abstract moral principles invari­
ably admit of plausible exceptions—that is something particularists are right about—
there is room to rationalise. Resolutions are what stand in the way of such 
rationalisation. It is precisely because of the vulnerability of moral principles to 
exceptions that personal moral rules are so important.9
Some forms of moral temptation are obvious. People want things even though 
they know that they are not entitled to them—to take them would be stealing, or 
would involve cheating, or fraud or the like. In such situations normally morally 
upright people will sometimes rationalise modestly immoral actions, but the room to 
do so is limited, and so the misbehaviour is correspondingly limited. People will, for 
instance, take a can of Coca­Cola from a communal refrigerator—that is hardly 
 stealing—but not the less valuable dollar bill that has been left there on a plate.10
Other cases of moral temptation are rather harder to spot, whether by actor or 
spectator. The temptation may not be driven by desire for personal gain. It may be 
driven by the desire to benefit others, or simply by the desire to be effectual, to get 
something done when one feels powerless. Such motivations bring us back to the 
 dismal story of the authorisation of torture by the Bush administration.
Some think that torture is never morally justified. But, as anyone who has taught 
a first­year class on the subject knows, it is far from obvious that that is the case. It is 
easy to construct a story in which it looks as though torture may be permissible, or 
even required. A staple is the ‘ticking bomb’ case: a bomb has been planted that will 
kill millions of innocents; the only hope is to defuse it. The terrorist who planted it has 
been captured, but refuses to say where it is. Time is short.
Should the terrorist be tortured in an effort to find the bomb? Opinions differ, but 
many think that torture here may well be morally justified; and for those who resist 
such a conclusion, it is easy to increase the numbers at risk from the bomb (What if  it 
8 Wieber et al. (2011).
9 Particularists standardly go further and say that moral principles invariably admit of genuine, rather 
than merely apparent, exceptions; I am sympathetic, but remain neutral on the issue here. For the canon­
ical statement see Dancy (1983). Clearly I am not inclined to conclude from this that moral principles 
have no useful role.
10 Ariely (2012). He presents a vivid set of empirical studies on the role of self­deception in maintaining 
a morally justifiable self­image, and on the constraints on it—the extent of the moral wiggle room.
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were half  the world?) and the nastiness of the terrorist (What if  he is gloats over the 
destructiveness of the bomb, which he designed to cause maximum suffering?). 
Nevertheless, if  such a ‘ticking bomb’ had been planted by a combatant in  wartime, 
torture would be legally prohibited. The Third Geneva Convention allows for no 
exceptions. Is this because the framers of the conventions never considered 
 ticking­ bomb cases or their like? Or because, whilst the framers were aware of them, 
they thought it clear that torture in any such case would be morally wrong? Either is 
possible, but it seems unlikely that such substantial moral claims would have been 
built into conventions that were designed to be universally adopted. More likely the 
framers of the conventions thought that, although ticking­bomb cases and their ilk 
could arise, the chance of them actually occurring, and moreover of the people 
involved correctly identifying them, is small. In contrast, once exceptions that allow 
for torture are in place legally, the likelihood that they will be unjustifiably exploited 
is large. Just as dieters do better if  they do not reconsider their diet at the moment they 
are tempted to eat, so, in time of war, combatants do better if  their personal rules 
forbid torture. Likewise legal policies do better by blocking torture in all cases, since, 
if  it is allowed in exceptional cases it is all too easy to come up with a story that in this 
case things really were exceptional. Policy on torture needs to be made in times of 
peace, and then adhered to in times of war.11 
This is certainly the view of many who have been involved in conflict. Two former 
Marine Generals, Charles Krulak and Joseph Hoar, wrote in The Washington Post 
that ‘Complex situational ethics cannot be applied during the stress of combat. The 
rules must be firm and absolute; if  torture is broached as a possibility it will become 
an actuality.’12 A failure to see this seems to be part of what happened during the Bush 
‘war on terror’; or at least, that is the most charitable gloss that can be placed on those 
events. Let us recall what happened. The US had fought two world wars, and then 
wars in Korea and Vietnam, in many cases against armies that were systematically 
11 It is striking that all of the four of the treaties that constitute the Geneva conventions were drafted in 
response to war. The first, which laid down rules to govern the treatment of the wounded and sick, was 
drafted in 1869 after the Crimean War and the Battle of Solferino. The second, which extended the rules 
to cover war at sea, was drafted in 1907 as the tenth Hague Convention, after the Russo–Japanese war. 
The third, which dealt with the treatment of prisoners of war, was drafted in 1929 after the First World 
War. And the fourth, which dealt with the treatment of civilians during war was drafted in 1949 after the 
Second World War, a time at which the three earlier treaties were all extensively revised. In each case the 
treaties tried to make good the shortcomings that the wars had revealed in earlier agreements.
12 Krulak & Hoar (2007). Jeff  McMahan (2008) also makes the point that the theoretical possibility of 
cases in which torture may be justified should not lead us to put into place institutional policies that ever 
allow torture (see pp. 124ff). What I am adding to this institutional claim is the idea that this reflects a 
general feature of resolutions, applicable even in the personal case.
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using torture, without itself  using torture as an officially sanctioned policy.13 This 
changed in 2002 when, under the direction of Donald Rumsfeld, it became explicit 
policy to reconsider the practice of interrogation, in particular to investigate the use of 
so­called ‘enhanced’ techniques.14 The result was the endorsement of a set of methods 
of interrogation—including throwing people against walls, facial slaps, stress positions, 
cramped confinement, sleep deprivation and, most notoriously, waterboarding—that 
most certainly counted as torture by international standards.15 
The level of self­deception that occurred once the question of whether to torture 
was opened up is striking: The Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), whose role it is to give 
legal advice to the executive, came up with a bizarrely restrictive account of what 
would constitute torture. If  physical it would require pain ‘of an intensity akin to that 
which accompanies serious physical injury such as death or organ failure’; if  mental it 
would require suffering bringing ‘lasting psychological harm, such as seen in mental 
disorders like post­traumatic stress disorder’. As it stands, such a definition is scarcely 
coherent: death is not a form of serious physical injury; it is rather something that may 
result from such injury; and neither death nor organ failure need be painful. More 
substantially, even if  something along these lines were properly formulated, it would 
have no precedent in US or international law, as the OLC could surely have seen. 
Other features of the OLC advice on the legality of torture were equally deluded: an 
attempt to defend it via an application of the doctrine of self­defence that was clearly 
legally hopeless, and an insistence, later overturned by the Supreme Court, that 
 detainees at Guantánamo fell outside the scope of the Geneva Conventions.16
13 That is not, of course, to say that US personnel never tortured in those wars; but it was never official 
policy. For extensive documentation of the role of the UK, France, and the US in developing and deploy­
ing ‘clean’, i.e. non­marking, torture, see Rejali (2007).
14 For an account of how Rumsfeld put in place a team of interrogators and lawyers who would open 
these questions see Sands (2008). Rumsfeld’s task was doubtless made easier by the writings of theor­
ists—Alan Dershowitz (2002) being the most prominent—who advocated the legalising of torture in 
ticking­bomb­style cases. For a more recent example, see Allhoff (2012). What is striking about this latter 
work is that an author whose basic motivation is consequentialist seems so utterly unconcerned about the 
consequences that his writing might have for those who are likely to torture in circumstances in which 
even he would think them unjustified.
15 See Sands (2008). For a compelling first­person account of how awful waterboarding is, see Hitchens 
(2008).
16 For discussion, see Sands (2008). Again, for the purposes of this article I give the most charitable diag­
nosis, the one that makes those involved least culpable. I am not sure that we should be so charitable, but 
many do see it this way. Thus Deputy Attorney General Joseph Margolis in his decision that John Yoo, 
one of the OLC team, should not face disciplinary action from the Pennsylvania Bar, wrote that ‘loyalty 
to his own ideology and convictions clouded his view of his obligation to his client and led him to author 
opinions that reflected his own extreme, albeit sincerely held, views of executive power while speaking for 
an institutional client’. Margolis, ‘Memorandum for the Attorney General’, 5 January 2010, available at: 
judiciary.house.gov/issues/issues_OPRReport.html.
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The connection between the official authorisation of torture and the general treat­
ment of US detainees, most centrally at Abu Ghraib, remains controversial. But there 
is much evidence that there was influence, so that, as Krulak and Hoar put it:
As has happened with every other nation that has tried to engage in a little bit of 
 torture—only for the toughest cases, only when nothing else works—the abuse spread 
like wildfire, and every captured prisoner became the key to defusing a potential 
 ticking time bomb … any degree of ‘flexibility’ about torture at the top drops down 
the chain of command like a stone—the rare exception fast becoming the rule. 17
Those who advocate rules that permit torture in ticking­bomb cases and the like are 
keen to insist that it will be carefully regulated; but that assumes that the regulators will 
be immune to self­deception in the face of temptation, something that the behaviour of 
the OLC during the Bush presidency should make us doubt. 
Why did this happen? Why did the Bush administration endorse torture during the 
‘War on Terror’ after a century of conflict in which it was prohibited? There may be 
many factors in play. I suggest a central one was that the administration succeeded in 
convincing itself  that things were sufficiently different that any prior resolutions—
whether encapsulated in legal rules or in less formal moral thinking—simply did not 
apply. This was a new world, with a new kind of enemy, one to be treated in a 
 completely different way. In retrospect, that looks absurd. But that was not how things 
seemed to some at the time, or, indeed, how they still seem to some now.
The approach I have been developing bears some similarities to rule utilitarianism, 
so let me conclude this section by stressing some differences. Rule utilitarianism insists 
that we sometimes have utilitarian reasons to abide by rules even if  the immediate 
result looks to be a reduction in utility: overall, we increase pleasure if  we stick to a 
rule of always telling the truth, even if  we can find particular cases in which lying 
brings more pleasure. An obvious difference in the approach I am advocating is that 
it need not be utilitarian: resolutions can serve to protect moral thinking of any kind. 
A prohibition on torture can be grounded in both utilitarian and non­utilitarian 
 considerations. But, second, and most relevant here, rule utilitarianism is typically 
presented as a response to the difficulties involved in calculating what action is best, 
and this often leads to the thought that it is a policy patronisingly enforced upon the 
less able by the more able. In Bernard Williams’s memorable phrase, it brings with it a 
whiff  of Government House.18 In contrast, self­deception in the face of temptation is 
17 Krulak & Hoar (2007). Henry Shue (1978) made a similar point about the likely spread of torture a 
long time ago. For discussion of the links between the torture policy authorised by Rumsfeld and the 
treatment of detainees at Abu Ghraib see Sands (2008) and Jeremy Waldron (2005). Waldron develops 
the idea of anti­torture law as an ‘archetype’, that fits well with the account presented here.
18 Williams (1985: Ch. 6).
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something to which we are all vulnerable. While we might hope that regulators will 
suffer from it less than most, they are far from immune, as the Bush White House 
shows. They needed the framework provided by prior resolutions; but they turned 
their back on them.
There is a further charge that is often levelled against utilitarianism, which is that it 
may well be a self­effacing policy: to be an effective utilitarian agent, one would need 
to believe that utilitarianism is false. Here again what I am advocating is different. To 
refuse to reconsider a resolution in times of temptation is not to turn against the use of 
reason; it is merely to turn against its use under those circumstances, exactly because 
those are circumstances in which it cannot be exercised well. It may be that simply try­
ing to decide whether or not these are tempting circumstances will be enough to trigger 
reconsideration, in which case the disposition to stick to one’s resolutions cannot itself  
involve the exercise of reason. But even that does not entail a rejection of reason.
My argument has been premised on the idea that ticking­bomb cases are rare, and 
that those that can at the time be identified as such are much rarer still. But what 
should happen if  one really were to occur? What should an interrogator do if  it was 
clear that very many lives were at risk, and that torture was the only likely way of 
saving them? I have no easy answer, just as I have no easy answer for what in general 
one should do if  it seems that breaking one’s resolutions, or breaking the law, would 
be best. In trivial cases, like dieting or exercise, there is always a trade­off  between the 
resoluteness needed to avoid judgement shift, and the risk of becoming inflexibly 
bound to a policy that should in some circumstances be broken. The real problem in 
such cases is the descriptive one of explaining how we can generally succeed in not 
reopening a question, while at the same time remaining vigilant for those cases where 
we should—a phenomenon which I suspect is best explained by positing two  somewhat 
independent systems, a conscious system of deliberation, and a second unconscious 
alarm system, which can trigger the first when a threshold is crossed (compare the fuel 
gauge on a car with the warning light that signals a nearly empty tank). In many such 
cases it does not matter if  the alarm system goes off  too readily, causing an  unwarranted 
re­evaluation: the odd indulgence is not going to cause any harm. 
In cases of potentially justified torture we cannot be so glib. If  a ticking­bomb 
case really arose, those confronted with it would have to decide what to do, and then 
the judiciary and the community would have to decide how to treat them in the light 
of what they had done. I think that they should certainly be liable to criminal 
 prosecution, even if  we conclude that what they did was justified, although of course 
this should be recognised in sentencing. We can only hope that such a case will not 
arise, since pre­emptively building provision for it into the law will make things much 
worse. This is one area in which we can embrace the maxim that hard cases—hard 
hypothetical cases—make bad law.
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So much, for now, for moral resolutions. Let us change direction for a while, and 
examine some recent work on the doctrine of double effect.
THOMSON AND SCANLON ON DOUBLE EFFECT
In its classical form, the doctrine of double effect is the claim that the moral standing 
of an action, most centrally its moral permissibility, can turn on the intentions of the 
agent. More specifically, it is that claim that there are certain acts with two effects (the 
‘double effect’), where acting with the intention of achieving one of them is permis­
sible, while acting with the intention of achieving the other is not. Many discussions 
of the doctrine have focused on reactions to particular cases. So, for instance, some 
have argued that dropping a bomb with the intention of destroying a legitimate mili­
tary target may be permissible, even if  it is known that civilians will be killed (the war 
is just, the target important, there is no other way of destroying it, etc); whereas drop­
ping the bomb in exactly the same place with the intention of killing those civilians is 
not. Others have disagreed. Stalemate looms.
Clearly we cannot rest with simple intuitions at this level. Judith Jarvis Thomson 
and Thomas Scanlon have tried to undercut the doctrine of double effect more funda­
mentally while explaining its apparent appeal. Their arguments are my concern here. 
I start with Thomson.
Thomson
Thomson makes use of a distinction between the evaluation of agents, and the 
 determination of what is permissible: ‘the question whether it is morally permissible 
to do a thing is just not the same as the question whether the person who does it is 
thereby shown to be a good person.’19 When it comes to evaluating agents—to  deciding 
whether they are kind, or generous or principled—it is quite right to take into account 
their mental states, including the intentions under which they act. In contrast, when 
we determine the permissibility of an action we should not, as a matter of course, 
look to the intention of the agent who performs it. Sometimes intentions will be 
 relevant—they may be relevant, for instance, in determining whether someone has 
made a promise, and that will be important in determining what is subsequently per­
missible. Less directly, intentions may give information about how wholeheartedly or 
carefully the agent will pursue the action, and that too might be relevant to its permis­
sibility. But in the absence of special features like these, the proper evaluation of the 
19 Thomson (1997: 517).
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permissibility of an action will proceed without reference to intentions. Proponents of 
the doctrine of double effect, who think that intentions will in general affect the 
 permissibility of an action, have thus run together two very different things. 
Thomson gives examples to support her argument. One case: suppose we had 
found out that Eisenhower was sending US troops onto the beaches of occupied 
France, not with the intention of liberating Europe, but with the intention of getting 
many of them killed. Would that have been a reason for trying to get the invasion 
cancelled? It might have been indirectly—a general with these intentions would hardly 
be a reliable military planner. But suppose we could be assured that the plan would be 
in no way compromised. Then, argues Thomson, we would have no reason cancel the 
invasion.20 The permissibility of the action rests on what will happen, not on the 
intentions with which it is performed.
Thomson’s second example we have already encountered. Consider a dying patient 
whose agony can only be relieved by a dose of morphine so strong that it will kill him. 
Does the permissibility of giving the dose depend on the intentions of the doctor? As 
we saw, Thomson argues that it does not. In thinking that it does, we conflate the 
 evaluation of the agent with that of the action:
If  a doctor will inject her patient intending his death as an end and, moreover, wants 
his death only because his death will constitute revenge, then that does matter morally. 
But we have to be careful about how it matters. I suggest that it has no bearing on 
whether it is morally permissible for her to act. Whatever her intention may be, the 
patient, we are supposing, desperately wants her to inject the drug.21
We should agree with Thomson that there is an important distinction between 
 evaluating the agent and evaluating the action, and that intentions may be relevant to 
the former when they are not relevant to the latter. And I am also inclined to agree 
that it is hard to see much moral difference between intending to end the patient’s pain 
with the knowledge that this will kill him, and intending to end his pain by killing him. 
However, that in itself  does not show that intentions will never make the difference 
between the permissibility and impermissibility of an action. If  Thomson wants to 
extend her argument to cover all cases, it has to encompass, as she accepts, the case 
where the doctor is motivated solely by desire for revenge. Should we accept what 
Thomson says there? 
Suppose that, rather than being a hospital official, you are the local prosecutor, 
and you come across compelling evidence that the doctor’s sole motivation in giving 
the injection was revenge. Would you be justified in instigating a murder prosecution 
against her? It strikes me that you would; indeed, you would be failing in your job if  
20 Thomson (1997: 516, n.19).
21 Thomson (1997: 516).
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you did not. Of course, in doing so you would almost certainly be making some 
 assessment of the doctor’s character. But I take it that that would not be the ground 
of the prosecution. We prosecute on the basis of the wrongness of the action, not on 
the defectiveness of the character. Killing from revenge is murder, and that is about as 
wrong an action as you can get.
Things might look somewhat different from the perspective of the hospital  official, 
though not, I think, fundamentally so. It is a little difficult to fill out the case, since it 
is hard to imagine that any doctor would go to an official to ask if  it is permissible to 
kill a patient from revenge: it is rather obvious what the answer would be. Suppose 
then that the official independently knows of the doctor’s motivation, and is faced 
with the question of whether to let her go ahead. If  the official’s primary concern is 
the good of the patient, and this can only be achieved by allowing the doctor to give 
the injection despite her vengeful motivation, then perhaps this is the course that the 
official should approve. But it is hard to imagine that such advice could be given with­
out qualm, even putting aside any concerns the official might have about becoming an 
accomplice. If  there were any other way of achieving the good end—changing the 
roster of doctors, for instance, so that a compassionate one would be in charge of the 
patient—then surely that would be the course to take.
There would, I think, be fewer qualms in the imaginary Eisenhower case: Thomson 
is surely right it would have been unthinkable to call off  the invasion on discovering 
the nature of Eisenhower’s intentions. A sufficient explanation of the difference may 
simply be that the outcome of the invasion was so much more important than any 
question of Eisenhower’s misdeeds. A second factor is that, whilst Eisenhower was at 
the centre of planning the invasion, it wasn’t just his project. If  it turned out that 
everyone involved in its organisation, from Roosevelt and Churchill down, was moti­
vated primarily by a desire to kill Allied troops, then we might find some pressure to 
think rather differently; but to imagine that is to imagine a situation so bizarre that it 
is hard to know what to think.
This is a further difference. The vengeful doctor presents us with a clear case of 
murder. During a war, in contrast, it is much harder to say what is and is not murder. Of 
course there are murders committed by combatants during wars, on non­ combatants, 
on combatants who have surrendered and the like. But once killing becomes  morally 
acceptable, as it does in a legitimate war, our conception of   murder becomes much 
harder to apply. Even a killing that is parallel to the doctor case, motivated entirely 
by considerations of  personal revenge, is less obviously murder when the two 
 protagonists are combatants in a legitimate war: the war provides a justification that 
the individual would lack. We might describe Eisenhower’s motives as murderous in 
the envisioned circumstances, but this is more of a rhetorical move than a substantial 
one.
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Is it important whether we can see an act as an instance of murder? I think it is—
just as it was important in our earlier discussion whether an act was an instance of 
torture. We will return to this issue a little later. But first I want to introduce Thomas 
Scanlon’s considerations on the topic, and to say some more about the general idea 
that questions of permissibility of action should look outward and not inward.
Scanlon
In a generally very sympathetic discussion of Thomson’s approach, Scanlon objects 
that the crucial distinction is not between the evaluation of an action and the evalu­
ation of an agent: his worry is that when we are concerned with particular actions, we 
can recognise that an agent is good, and that their motivation is good, but still think 
that they have made a morally bad decision. So in place of Thomson’s distinction, 
Scanlon wants to draw a new one between the role of principles as guides to deliber­
ation and their role as standards of criticism; or, in short, between the deliberative 
stance and the critical stance.22 
The basic idea is this: when we assess the moral standing of a possible action there 
are two different things that we might be doing. The first, taking the deliberative 
stance, involves us in looking, as if  from the point of view of the actor, at the consid­
erations for and against that action. That is what actors themselves do, but it is not 
limited to them; it is also what we do when we give them advice. The second, taking 
the critical stance, involves assessing the way that an agent goes about deciding on a 
particular action. Scanlon’s contention is that when we take the critical stance in this 
latter way, intentions are relevant. But when we take the deliberative stance, they are 
not. When an agent deliberates what to do, they cannot look to their own intentions 
as relevant factors, and nor can we cite their intentions in giving them advice. (We put 
aside cases where the intention makes a difference to the obligations that the agent is 
under: for instance, where they have made a promise.) 
Furthermore, according to Scanlon, the issue of permissibility concerns only the 
first, deliberative, question. Putting these two contentions together then takes him, via 
a somewhat different route, to much the same conclusion as Thomson’s. For while we 
may take their intentions into account in criticising an agent, Scanlon holds that the 
proponent of the doctrine of double effect makes a mistake in saying that intention is 
relevant to the permissibility of  the agent’s action.23
22 Scanlon (2008: 20–5).
23 At times Scanlon seems to identify the deliberative question with the question of what is permissible: 
‘As guides to deliberation, moral principles answer a question of permissibility: “May one do X?” ’ (2008: 
22). I am not happy with phrasing this entirely in terms of permissibility, which I think has a firmer place 
in a legal setting than in much ordinary moral thought. We might think, from the deliberative position, 
322 Richard Holton 
There is something plausible in this, an insight that Scanlon’s account shares with 
Thomson’s. Surely agents cannot make actions permissible just by forming the right 
intention: they cannot bootstrap them into permissibility. Returning to our earlier 
example, the bomber pilot who wanted the civilians dead could surely not think ‘It is 
impermissible to drop the bomb intending the deaths of civilians, but it is permissible 
to drop a bomb with the intention of destroying the military target, so that’s what I’ll 
intend’ and thereby make the action permissible. But then equally, we might think, 
having formed a certain intention in the past should not make any difference. If  an 
action is permissible this is something that is determined by how the world stands, 
independent of the mental life of the actor (again we put to one side special cases like 
having made a promise). The focus of moral deliberators should be outward, towards 
the world, and not inward, towards their own states of mind. We might think worse 
of the bomber pilot who intends the death of the civilians, but in answering the 
 deliberative question of whether it is permissible to drop the bomb, this is beside the 
point.
LOOKING OUTWARD AND MORAL RESOLUTION
Despite the plausibility of these considerations, in the light of what I said earlier 
about moral resolutions, I do not think that this way of putting the point can be right. 
It cannot be the case that in deliberating about how to act, or in advising others on 
how to act, we should always look out to the world, rather than in to the agent’s inten­
tions. Very often, if  I am to act well, I will need to deliberate by looking to my moral 
resolutions. Similarly, when we ask someone for moral advice, it may be that the best 
they can give is to point us back to our resolutions. ‘We don’t torture’ may have been 
the best thing that the Bush administration could have been told. But resolutions are 
just a special sort of intention. It follows that we will need to look to our intentions.
It might be objected to this that the content of the resolution is just the moral rule, 
and not the intention to follow that rule, so that morally resolute agents are not really 
looking to their resolutions, but to the rules beyond them. On this approach, in resolv­
ing not to torture, an agent comes to believe that torture is wrong; the resolution just 
serves to preserve that belief. That, however, is to misunderstand the role that resolu­
tions need to play. I suggested that the agent who resolves not to torture may well 
think that there could be situations in which torture would be morally justified. So 
that it would be better not to perform some selfish act, without thinking it actually impermissible to do 
so. Scanlon suggests that talk of the good is only apt for evaluation and not for deliberation (24–5); 
again, I do not see why. But I will stick mainly with talk of ‘permissible’, together with its its dual, ‘not 
permissible not’, i.e. obligatory, and their negations.
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reminding themselves of a moral rule that might admit of exceptions would not do 
the work that is required; on the contrary, it may well make things worse, since it 
would encourage further deliberation about whether the rule should apply in this case, 
deliberation that might well culminate in the conclusion that it should not: that was 
what we saw in the dieting case. What the agent needs is the resolution, which is essen­
tially self­regarding: I do not torture; or, perhaps better, since it gives the individual 
commitment the backing of group solidarity: We, the members of this community, do 
not torture, which was the idea I attributed to Obama.
This provides an important corrective to the idea that moral deliberation should 
only look out to the world. In itself, though, it provides no support to the doctrine of 
double effect. For the advantages given by resolutions that we have considered so far 
are merely pragmatic: they enable us to avoid temptation. Perhaps they also confer an 
epistemic advantage: they enable us to keep in touch with the moral truth. But from 
what we have seen so far, they do not make any difference to the permissibility of an 
action: their existence does not make an action permissible or impermissible.24
There is, however, a further consideration. How should we understand the content 
of resolutions? They do not, by their nature, have to make reference to intentional 
actions. While I might resolve not to murder or to torture, it seems that I could equally 
resolve not to kill, or resolve not to cause suffering. My suggestion, though, is that to 
be effective resolutions will need intentional contents. Recall that, in Thomson’s 
 hospital case, things seemed to change once we raised the possibility that the doctor 
was in the business, not just of killing the patient, but of murdering him. Murder is an 
intentional notion. Let us turn once again to that.
INTENTIONAL CONCEPTS
When Thomson and Scanlon insist that permissibility of an action is independent of 
the actor’s intention, I take it that they are committed to thinking that the action can 
be identified independently of that intention. But can we identify actions inde­
pendently of intentions? Many verbs, especially those that are used in moral assess­
ment, build in intentions: ‘to murder’; ‘to steal’; ‘to rape’; ‘to defraud’; ‘to mock’; ‘to 
cheat’; ‘to torture’; ‘to humiliate’. The contrast is with non­intentional verbs like ‘to 
drop’ or ‘to kill’. As a first approximation, we can think of the non­intentional verbs 
as those that we can prefix with modifiers like ‘unintentionally’ or ‘inadvertently’ with­
out causing bafflement. We can straightforwardly say that someone unintentionally 
24 Scanlon sometimes talks this way; e.g. ‘what made the action wrong was not that I have acted for a bad 
(selfish) reason’ (2008: 24; his emphasis).
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killed, but it would be rather odd to say that they unintentionally murdered. Conversely, 
adding the modifier ‘intentionally’ to a non­intentional verb adds content. To say that 
someone intentionally killed is to say more than that they killed; whereas to say that 
they intentionally murdered is to say no more than that they murdered. Exactly which 
intentions are needed for the application of any of these verbs is often a matter of 
debate: does murder require that one is trying to kill, or that one is reckless about 
whether one will? Such debates have echoed around both legal and informal usage. 
But there is no serious debate that there is some intentional requirement built into the 
very notion of murder.
Empirical psychological findings show that moral assessment and the use of 
 intentional descriptions are intimately tied up: people tend to use ‘higher level’, inten­
tional descriptions when a good thing is done by someone they like (‘tipping 
 generously’), but ‘lower level’ non­intentional descriptions when the same thing is 
done by people they don’t like (‘adding extra money to the bill’); the tendency is 
reversed if  it is a bad thing done.25 Moving away from intentional descriptions is a way 
of moving away from moral attribution altogether.
If  opponents of the doctrine of double effect think that intention is not relevant 
to permissibility, then presumably they must think that even if  we naturally character­
ise actions using intentional concepts when we morally evaluate them, if  we want to 
properly evaluate their permissibility we should strip them down to a corresponding 
thin non­intentional concept. That assumes that we can do so: it assumes that where 
we have an intentional action, to , there will be a equivalent description, to intention­
ally , where ‘’ is a non­intentional verb; and it is the permissibility of ­ing that we 
need to assess. But can we strip concepts down in this way?
It may be possible in any particular case to give a non­intentional description of a 
bad action in such a way that it is clear what is wrong with it. But can we give a general 
characterisation that would serve to feature in a resolution? Consider how we might 
try to formulate a non­intentional resolution that would do the work done by a reso­
lution against torture. It will not do just to formulate it as ‘We will treat our detainees 
as well as circumstances permit’, since clearly those who are inclined to torture will 
argue that these circumstances do require it. So we might go to the other extreme of 
specificity and say: ‘We do not inflict waterboarding on detainees’, ‘We do not deprive 
detainees of sleep’, etc. But, whilst admirably clear, and hence well proofed against the 
attempt to provide exceptions, that would be much too limited; it would just be an 
25 Kozak et al. (2006). To be clear: the authors do not identify ‘higher level’ descriptions with the intentional; 
they rather think of them in terms of a by­construction: one does a relatively higher level action by doing 
an appropriate lower level one. Nevertheless, in the examples that they give, the higher level actions are 
typically intentional, the lower level ones typically not (‘She tipped generously by adding extra money to 
the bill’).
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invitation to invent new tortures. Or we might try to characterise actions in terms of 
their effects: ‘We do not cause pain or humiliation to our detainees’, etc. But that is 
too broad. Mere capture will be humiliating to many, and a certain amount of pain 
may be the unavoidable result of keeping people secure, and of providing the medical 
care that they need. The natural response at this point is to say that they should not 
be hurt or humiliated on purpose; but with which purpose? People should not be hurt 
or humiliated, one might say, with the purpose of torturing them, which takes us back 
to where we started. If  it is to be effective, the resolution needs to strike a balance 
between being too open ended, which will lead to too much reconsideration, with all 
of the risks of self­deluded rationalisation, and too specific, which will get the exten­
sion wrong. It will need to be, as we might say, sufficiently predictive of  moral 
wrong­doing. My claim is that only the intentional notion of torture can play the 
needed role here. 
There is nothing, apart, perhaps, from its awfulness, that is special about torture. 
Though I will not argue the case here, I suggest that much the same account can be 
given of the other core intentional notions that feature in our moral and legal think­
ing: to murder, to steal, to rape, to defraud and the like. These too are intentional for 
a reason; and we can get an insight into that reason by looking at their role in resolu­
tions. If  they are to feature in resolutions that have the right kind of force, they will 
need to be intentional. 
Note that I am not saying that being intentional is good enough for a concept to 
play this role. We can create intentional notions by simple prefixing ‘intentionally’ 
onto non­intentional ones. From ‘to drop’ we can create ‘to intentionally drop’; from 
‘to kill’ we can create ‘to intentionally kill’. That will not do the work. Return to 
Thomson’s case of the doctor and the dying patient. In that case, I argued, it made all 
the difference if  we saw the doctor’s act as an act of murder. So one resolution that we 
might expect people to have—one that we might hope would go without remark in 
any decent person—is a resolution not to murder. Is that the same as a resolution not 
to kill? Absolutely not. The compassionate doctor who is prepared to use euthanasia 
sometimes has a resolution not to murder but no resolution not to kill. Her critic 
might, of course, argue that euthanasia is murder; but that is a substantial moral 
claim, and one that such a doctor will reject.
I have argued elsewhere that these intentional concepts are prime, in the sense that 
they cannot be factored into a mental element—the mens rea—and an outcome—the 
actus reus.26 I will not repeat that argument, which is modelled on Williamson’s argu­
ment about knowledge.27 Let me just distinguish it from a rather more familiar claim 
26 Holton (2015); revised version forthcoming in Gardner et al.
27 Williamson (2000).
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with which it might be confused. It is sometimes claimed that concepts like murder are 
morally ‘thick’ in that they combine both descriptive and evaluative content: describ­
ing something as a murder (rather than just a killing) is to express one’s moral 
 disapproval.28 About that I have my doubts. It seems to me that a sufficiently perverse 
god might make it morally right for me to murder, by, say, hanging the fate of the rest 
of the human race on whether I will do so. Indeed, if  something like moral particular­
ism is correct, it will be possible to arrive at such cases for any concept. At most there 
may be some prima facie disapproval, but even there it does not seem incoherent 
(rather than utterly morally perverse) for someone to argue that murder is in general 
a good thing. In contrast, my claim is that we cannot deny the intentionality of 
 murder—the idea that it has a mens rea—although we might, of course, dispute 
exactly how that is to be understood.
DOUBLE EFFECT RECONCEIVED
If  this is on the right lines, then the debate around the doctrine of double effect looks 
rather different. As we saw, the standard move in trying to assess it is to take  apparently 
identical actions, and then to vary the intention with which they are performed: the 
actor does the same thing, but with a different intent. Then a judgement is made about 
whether the two cases differ in their permissibility. The defender of the doctrine says 
that sometimes the permissibility does differ; the opponent says that it does not. My 
contention has been that this approach is methodologically flawed. If  actions are to be 
characterised in intentional terms, holding the action fixed whilst varying the inten­
tion is not in general possible. To that extent, then, both supporters and critics of the 
doctrine have been working with a false presupposition when describing such cases.
The picture that we have in its place is of numerous different intentional concepts 
that we invoke when we make moral judgements. Intentions matter because these con­
cepts matter, and they are intentional. To that extent, the defender of the doctrine of 
double effect has got something right. This is not to say that we have a fixed number 
of such intentional concepts, and that moral reasoning simply consists of applying 
them. The process of moral reasoning has involved refining the ideas we have (so that 
a killing may be a murder if  it is done inadvertently but recklessly, but will not be if  
done in necessary self­defence; or an act of theft is not blameworthy, though it is still 
28 For a set of recent essays on the idea, see Kirchen (2013). Note that neither Ryle (1968, 2009), who is 
often taken as the originator of this approach, nor Geertz (1973), who has done so much to develop in 
within anthropology, thought of thick concepts as exclusively moral in this way. Plausibly, though, they 
did both think of them as intentional.
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an act of theft, if  it is done under sufficient duress). Sometimes mere refinement is not 
enough: the concept of sexual harassment simply was not around fifty years ago, but 
we have it now. Having it has enabled us to gain moral insight that was formerly 
obscured, and to form resolutions—how to act, but also how to respond to others’ 
acts—in consequence.29 Other concepts that once figured large in our moral thinking 
have now largely dropped out: for instance, the idea of honour. Just as with science so 
with ethics: progress requires us to get our conceptual vocabulary right.
There is thus no guarantee that every case will be covered by some relevant 
 intentional concepts; and even if  it is, there is no guarantee that our corresponding 
moral evaluations will be right. Much of the controversy concerning permissibility 
concerns exactly the cases that are not so covered: cases, for instance, around euthan­
asia, or the ethics of war, where much of the debate about double effect has taken 
place. It could be that we have yet to develop the relevant intentional vocabulary here: 
advances in medical technology make that not implausible in the former case at least; 
perhaps the same can be said of warfare, although there, while the methods have 
become way more efficient, the basic issues look largely unchanged. If  no such devel­
opment is forthcoming, we have to do the best we can using the standard combination 
of intuitive responses and general­purpose principles.
My surmise will be that in such cases intentions will turn out to matter little to 
permissibility; those are the cases to which Thomson and Scanlon devote much of 
their discussion, and that loom large in discussions of double effect more generally. 
But we will fail to see what was right about the doctrine of double effect if  we fail to 
see that the categories we apply in more familiar terrain are shot through with 
intentionality.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
I have taken a rather winding path: from the role of resolutions, to the nature of the 
actions in terms of which those resolutions should be framed, to the role of intentions 
in moral permissibility. I am sure that that is not the only path that I could have taken 
to any of these conclusions. Rather than looking at intentional notions through the 
lens of resolutions, I could have looked at them more directly in terms of moral evalu­
ation. There is something, I hope, to be gained, though, in looking at a topic from a 
slightly less familiar direction. Thomson and Scanlon have greatly improved our dis­
cussion of double effect by focusing on deliberation and advice; my contention has 
been that here too intention, and resolution, have a central role to play.
29 For a philosophical discussion, see Fricker (2007).
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